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O

n 7 October 2001, the Bush administration launched Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) to dislodge al Qaeda forces, neutralize the Taliban in
Afghanistan, and decapitate their respective leadership. President Bush insisted
that the United States was not at war with the Afghan people or with Islam,
and the Afghan civilian population was not identified as the enemy. Therefore,
the Pentagon attempted to minimize civilian casualties. OEF toppled the
Taliban regime, but did not eliminate the Taliban influence in Afghanistan. The
Taliban, although expelled from power, still preserved connections with the
rural Pashtun.
Following the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the American agenda for
Afghanistan rapidly metamorphosed into a nation-building project. In theory,
the reconstruction and democratic reform of Afghanistan offered an opportunity to transform one of the poorest countries on earth. Afghanistan had a 90
percent illiteracy rate, one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world,
and an average life expectancy of just over forty years. The living conditions
for women were particularly harsh and cruel, since the Taliban had restricted
their access to education, health care, and work. President Bush justified
nation-building in Afghanistan in moral and political terms. After liberating
“[Afghanistan] from a primitive dictatorship . . . we had a moral obligation
to leave behind something better. We also had a strategic interest in helping
the Afghan people build a free society . . . because a democratic Afghanistan
would be a hopeful alternative to the vision of the extremists.”1 The idea of
liberation played an overwhelming role in President Bush’s postwar strategy
for Afghanistan. The Bush administration assumed that once freed from the
shackles of the Taliban tyranny, the Afghan population would embrace the
Western agenda of reconstruction and institutional development. The Western
allies put in place an interim government in Kabul led by Hamid Karzai, and
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the loya jirga approved a new constitution in 2003. The International Security
Assistance Force, under British command, began training a new Afghan army,
and the United Nations developed a humanitarian assistance plan as well as educational initiatives to combat illiteracy and increase educational opportunities
for girls and women.
It is evident the ambitious American-led project of democratization
faltered. After eleven years of combat, the United States and its North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have drastically modified their objectives in
Afghanistan. President Obama decided to withdraw the majority of American
forces by 2014, and his administration has narrowed the aims of American
intervention in the country. The Obama administration’s goal is to leave behind
native military and police structures that in principle should prevent al Qaeda
and other terrorist groups from operating with impunity. Why has the United
States been unable to accomplish its original objectives in Afghanistan when it
was able to radically transform two formidable enemies, Germany and Japan,
following World War II (WWII)?
Several competing explanations have been advanced to explain this
failure. David Edelstein, Chair of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown
University, claims that military occupations succeed only if they occur in a
“threat environment” in which the security, survival, and integrity of an occupied territory is menaced. According to Edelstein, in the absence of a strong
and believable external threat, the desire for self determination is inevitable,
and the emergence of a significant movement of resistance, unavoidable.2 Dov
S. Zakheim, the former Undersecretary of Defense, claims the Bush administration seriously underfunded the reconstruction of Afghanistan because it had
become increasingly focused on Iraq.3 In fact, Afghanistan received less assistance per capita than did postconflict Bosnia and Kosovo, and the budget for
the reconstruction of Afghanistan amounted to less than half of what the United
States spent in Iraq. Jason Lyall, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale
University, attributes the Afghanistan failure to bad planning, and blames the
Bush administration for creating a weak and over-centralized Kabul government that does not have real political authority.4 Stanley N. Katz, Professor in
Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, and others, claim that
a project of democratization by force cannot succeed in an underdeveloped
society without significant endogenous experience in democratic constitutionalism.5 Seth Jones, political scientist at RAND Corporation, emphasizes
the difficulty of state-building in a country that lacks the tradition of a strong
central government, and where “power has often come from the bottom up.”6
He asserts the number of coalition troops in Afghanistan was never sufficient
to ensure law and order, and this fact led to a security vacuum permitting
the emergence of the insurgency.7 Although these explanations are plausible
and may to some extent be correct, it is this author’s contention that the main
reason why the United States failed to radically transform Afghanistan is the
type of war that preceded the occupation phase. OEF, a limited counterterrorist
war, left intact the capacity of the occupied society to react against the foreign
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invader. The American experience in Germany and Japan suggests that, in the
absence of ideological and political congruence between the occupied and the
occupier, democratization by force can only have a chance of success in the
aftermath of a war that results in the catastrophic defeat of the enemy. WWII
was maximally destructive and brutal, and violence was often indiscriminate.
In WWII, the Allies not only destroyed the enemy armies but also deliberately
targeted the civilian population of Germany and Japan.8 When the war ended
with the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers, the Germans and the
Japanese were in a state of psychological paralysis and war weariness that made
them compliant. The magnitude of defeat had multiple effects:
•• It diminished the risk of resistance and armed insurgency.
•• It allowed the military governments to achieve and maintain a monopoly of
violence, information, and propaganda in the postwar.
•• It enabled the occupiers to implement their revolutionary political and ideological agenda.
The absence of insurgency permitted the process of reconstruction and
reeducation to proceed unchallenged. In the case of Afghanistan, there was
no ideological congruence between the occupiers and the occupied, and the
war was deliberately designed to minimize collateral damage. There were relatively few civilian casualties, and OEF did not destroy the multilayered bonds
between the rural Pashtun population and radical Islamist militants. When the
Bush administration began the process of reconstruction and democratization,
the NATO allies struggled with the discrepancy between their agenda and
the aspirations of the Afghan population. The transformative postwar project
faltered because OEF had not created the context of possibilities in which a
military occupation could impose a lasting and radical political agenda on a
nonreceptive population.9
The case of Afghanistan exemplifies the challenges associated with
attempting to democratize a reluctant population by force. Small wars aimed
at regime change do not create the conditions for executing such ambitious
agendas as nation building. The decapitation of the regime’s leaders or the transient defeat of a guerrilla movement does not necessarily lead to popular support
for a program of radical change inspired by the victors. A military occupation
following a war with limited violence will exacerbate nationalism, sectarianism, and militarism, passions that fuel resentment and the violent rejection of
a foreign agenda. In Afghanistan, the presence of the Western allies, and their
attempt to impose ideas of governance, first generated skepticism, then political
resistance, and finally the emergence of a full-fledged insurgency. NATO forces
became involved in a counterinsurgency operation that inevitably led to human
rights violations and unacceptable excesses. This resulted in the consequent
loss of the moral high ground that supposedly inspired the original occupation,
and led to the collapse of the transformative agenda.
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Germany and Japan
The occupation of the Axis powers were not improvised affairs. The
nature of the enemy was the subject of intensive debate prior to the declaration of
war against Germany and Japan. Psychological, sociological, anthropological,
cultural, and political analysis of the German and Japanese regimes intensified after 1942. Even before Pearl Harbor, the US Army created the School of
Military Government to train military officers on the complex tasks of conducting military occupations. This initiative expanded rapidly after the Casablanca
Conference in January 1943.10 The American military occupations of western
Germany and Japan were revolutionary. While in endogenous revolutions
extreme violence continues throughout the consolidation period, the violence
associated with the American transformative occupations occurred before the
occupations. In WWII, the Allies demanded the unconditional surrender of the
Axis, and to attain this strategic objective they used their complete arsenal to
destroy the German and the Japanese armies, cripple their war industries, and
create havoc among the civilian populations. The Allies occupied Germany and
the United States occupied Japan after a hugely destructive war in which none
of the belligerents abided by the present-day Western rules on the treatment of
civilian populations.
The consequences were catastrophic. The American forces who
occupied both countries found a landscape of physical devastation. Two eminently developed and urban societies had been decimated. The Germans and
the Japanese were psychologically shattered by the magnitude of defeat and
struggled to survive in an environment characterized by social dislocation and
political anarchy. Following the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers, the
American military governments were able to institute a revolutionary program
of political, ideological, and cultural change. The dimension of the German
and Japanese defeat permitted America to develop transformative occupation
agendas without fear of armed resistance. Even though large sectors of the
German and Japanese populations were initially resentful of the allied victory
and adhered to the ideological tenets of the defeated regimes, they accepted
the new normative principles imposed by the occupiers. In both Germany and
Japan, the cult of ultranationalism and racism was suppressed, and the success
of American political, cultural, and educational reforms is underlined by the fact
they did not reemerge once the countries became independent and sovereign.
Much of Germany had been reduced to rubble. By the end of the war, a
quarter of the German population had been killed or taken prisoner. More than
five million German soldiers had lost their lives, leaving more than a million
widows.11 Eleven million German soldiers had been taken prisoner by the Allied
forces. The Anglo-American strategic air campaign had caused 600,000 civilian deaths and wounded 900,000. Münster, Lübeck, Ausburg, Köln, Bremen,
the Ruhr industrial region, Berlin, Hamburg, and Dresden had been subjected
to punishing air raids. The bombing of Dresden had caused between 25,000
and 30,000 deaths, and the 27 to 28 July 1943, air raid of Hamburg had resulted
in 42,600 civilian deaths.12 The Soviet invasion of Germany was bloody and
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merciless, and the battle for Berlin alone resulted in 100,000 civilian deaths.
More than seven million people were left homeless. The Nazi Party and the
German civil administration collapsed, and the German currency ceased to
exist. There was no police, no public transportation, and communication networks had been obliterated. There were severe shortages of food, coal, gas, and
electricity. The situation was aggravated by the flow of millions of Germans
returning to Germany—those escaping from the former eastern territories,
demobilized soldiers, and the recently liberated survivors of Nazi camps. The
German population was weary, dispirited, and in shock. Civil society was
totally disrupted, and it was the Allied presence that provided stability and
prevented a total collapse of order and descent into a Hobbesian world.
In Japan, the situation was similarly catastrophic. Two million Japanese
soldiers and close to one million civilians had been killed by the end of the war.
The deliberate air bombing of the main Japanese cities resulted in 400,000
civilian deaths. Every Japanese city, apart from Kyoto, had been targeted by
the American air force. Tokyo was first bombed on 18 April 1942. In midFebruary 1945, the US Air Force conducted 2,700 sorties against Tokyo and
Yokohama, and on 9 March, 334 B-29s launched a major incendiary attack
against the capital that killed 83,000 Japanese civilians, injured 100,000, and
left 1.5 million homeless. On 23 to 24 May, 500 bombers dropped 1.5 million
incendiaries, sparing neither residential nor industrial areas.13 In fact, casualties
from the carpet bombing of Tokyo and Nagoya with conventional explosives
rivaled those from the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic
bombs. The systematic air campaign left millions of civilians injured, sick, and
malnourished, and nearly nine million people were homeless. The Japanese
army was shattered and the institution disgraced. The Japanese industrial sector
was in shambles—one third of all industrial machine tools were destroyed and
four-fifths of the Japanese commercial fleet had been sunk. Defeat had left
Japanese society fractured, ashamed, and disoriented.14
Germany and Japan were not liberated—they were occupied as defeated
nations. The Americans were not merely interested in the capture, punishment,
or proscription of the leaders of the genocidal enemy regimes, but rather in
the radical ideological reeducation of the civilian populations who had willingly accepted or tolerated them, and who had been involved in the racist and
expansionist projects of their respective governments. For decades, the German
and Japanese societies had been indoctrinated in an ideology of extreme and
extremist ultranationalism, and were influenced by antidemocratic, illiberal,
racist, and militaristic traditions. In the case of Germany, the defeat in World
War I (WWI), the Russian Revolution, the Versailles Treaty, and the Weimar
experience, created a fertile ground for political radicalism. Hitler capitalized
on this violent discontent and emerged as the popular leader of a police state
built on extreme nationalism, ultramilitarism, antisemitism, and terror.15 In the
case of Japan, the country’s ultranationalist, militaristic, autocratic, nationalist,
and imperialist tradition was exacerbated in 1926 when Emperor Hirohito took
power. From then on, the Japanese government engaged in a massive nationalist
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and racist propaganda campaign to justify its expansionist agenda for the control
of Asian resources. Japan waged WWII as a holy war of the superior Yamato
race against China and the Allies.
In 1945, the American political project for Germany and Japan included
the complete restructuring of the political culture, the ideological tenets, and the
institutional framework of both countries. In both occupations, the idea was to
transform nationalist, racist, militarist, and authoritarian societies into nonaggressive liberal democracies allied with the United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
Directive 1067 (JCS 1067), the military directive that informed the American
occupation forces in Germany until 1947, specified the aims of the American
occupation as denazification, democratization, demilitarization, and economic
decentralization. JCS 1380/15, the directive that informed the American military government in Japan, stipulated a similar agenda of reconstruction and
reform. It instructed the Supreme Command of the Allied Forces (SCAP) in
Japan, General Douglas MacArthur, to change Japan from a feudal, racist, and
militaristic empire into a peaceful democracy allied to the United States. SCAP
was to democratize, disarm, demilitarize, and implement economic reform (the
deconcentration of the Japanese zaibatsu.)
Although in both cases the occupation governments led a process of
revolutionary reform that went against prevalent structures and mores, the
Americans did not confront armed resistance. In Germany, during the first
weeks of the occupation, the US Army underlined its power by conducting
surprise raids looking for hidden weapons, which occasionally culminated in
executions that served as public warnings. In Japan, the Americans engaged
in preemptive displays of force. For example, after Japan surrendered, a continuous parade of B-29 super-fortresses, naval bombers, and fighters flew over
the country to intimidate the population. The day in which the document of
unconditional surrender was signed, a flight of 462 B-29s darkened the sky over
Tokyo Bay.16 The catastrophic nature of the defeat, and the continuous threat
of violence, allowed the Americans to enforce their rules, orders, and policies
on malleable populations who did essentially what was demanded. In 1945, the
United States had 1,660,000 troops in Germany; by the end of 1946 the number
had been reduced to 200,000. In November 1945, there were 386,000 American
troops stationed in Japan, but by mid-1946, given the lack of resistance and
insurgency, the number dropped to approximately 150,000.17
In the absence of resistance, the American military governments
started the process of physical reconstruction while simultaneously advancing their political and ideological agendas. The Office of Military Government
US (OMGUS) and SCAP were able to guarantee security, feed the population,
avoid sanitary disasters, restore public transportation, and ensure an adequate
supply of oil and carbon. In Germany, the US Army first, and then OMGUS,
embarked on a massive campaign of purging, censorship, propaganda, and
iconoclasm. During the first month of the occupation, the US Army carried
out the confrontation policy, and forced thousands of German men, women,
and children living in the vicinity of German concentration camps to tour the
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premises, to bury corpses, and to attend funeral services for the dead. In the
first stage of the occupation, American rhetoric emphasized German civilian
complicity with the crimes of the Third Reich. This stress on German collective guilt waned rapidly, but the denazification and demilitarization campaigns
continued. The Americans outlawed Nazi political, military, and repressive
institutions, banned Nazi, nationalist, and militarist propaganda, and tried
Nazi leaders and military commanders involved in crimes against humanity.
Nazi racial laws were eradicated from German legislation, and Nazi premises, property, assets, and loot, were seized. The display of Nazi uniforms,
parades, flags, and symbols was banned. Street names, public monuments and
statues, and symbols associated with Nazism and militarism were destroyed
or removed.18 OMGUS made the entire adult population in the American zone
and sector fill out Fragebogen, detailed political questionnaires. In July 1945,
80,000 Nazi leaders were arrested, and 70,000 Nazi activists were fired from the
civil service. By 1 June 1946, more than 1,650,000 Germans—approximately
one of every ten persons in the US zone—had been investigated, and 373,762
(nearly one fourth) removed from their positions.19 Eighty to eighty-five percent
of teachers were dismissed for political reasons, and university faculties were
purged.20 This process amounted to a revolution from above to radically change
German politics, culture, and self-perception.
Although Hitler’s popularity waned in the last months of the war
when it became obvious that the war had been lost, the catastrophic defeat of
the Third Reich did not automatically denazify the Germans. American intelligence surveys from 1945 to 1949 indicate that many Germans still harbored
antidemocratic feelings. One year after the end of the war, only three in ten
Germans in the American zone and sector were consistently prodemocratic,
according to OMGUS estimates.21 Polls taken in September 1946 indicated fiftyfive percent of respondents in the American zone, and forty-four percent in the
American sector of Berlin, still believed National Socialism “was a good idea
badly carried out.”22 In December 1946, OMGUS intelligence analyses found
“an increase in antisemitic feelings among the German people.”23 In May 1947,
OMGUS intelligence analysts reported increased German hostility against
the American presence in Germany, increased nationalism, increased political apathy, increased contempt toward Germans working for the US military,
and increased antisemitism and racialism.24 This reality puts in perspective
the significant effort that was required to reform German society and culture,
and to suppress the open allegiance to Nazism, militarism, antisemitism, and
ultranationalism. American control, not simply German conviction, blocked
the immediate reemergence of public expressions of Nazism, militarism, and
antisemitism in occupied Germany.
The postwar occupation of Japan was also a revolutionary process.
General MacArthur ruled the country as the American viceroy and exerted
unrestricted authority over the Japanese population. His actions, as well as
those of his subordinates, were unappealable and beyond criticism. SCAP transformed the role of the emperor and reshaped religion in Japan. The emperor was
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kept as the symbolic head of government, but was forced to renounce his divinity. Hirohito became a figurehead devoid of political and religious power, a
puppet of the military government. This was a radical departure from tradition,
because Japan had a state religion, Shinto, in which Hirohito was the highest
priest, the representative on earth of the sun goddess, the “race-father,” and the
commander-in-chief of the imperial Japanese armed forces. MacArthur outlawed Shinto, and dissolved the hitherto uncontested alliance between church
and state that had been one of the foundations of modern Japanese ultranationalism. In 1947, a small group of lawyers from the government section of SCAP
wrote a new constitution for Japan. This document replaced the 1889 Japanese
constitution, a fundamentally antidemocratic document (allegedly a gift from
the gods), that concentrated all power in the hands of the emperor and his ministers. The old constitution codified racism, militarism, authoritarianism, and
imperialist dogma, and limited franchise. The new constitution was in many
ways more progressive than the American. It mandated the strict separation
of religion and state, abolished the patriarchal household system, guaranteed
civil liberties, religious freedom, and women’s equality, gave women legal and
voting rights, and established the Peace Clause. In fact, SCAP controlled every
facet of Japanese life—information, propaganda, politics, finances, economics,
education, law, science, culture, trade, taxation, trade unions, and military intelligence. SCAP’s censorship was massive and all-encompassing. For example,
the Japanese were forbidden from discussing Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and
all visual evidence of the consequences of the air bombing campaign against
Japan was sequestered and sent to Washington, D.C.25 SCAP officers removed
militaristic influences from every aspect of Japanese life. Military and paramilitary organizations were disbanded, and military equipment destroyed. Military
officers and civil servants who had directly participated in the design and execution of imperial war policies were arrested and tried for war crimes. Existing
political parties and associations came under SCAP control, and the bureaucracy, police, and judicial system were purged. Japanese cultural life, from film
to literature, was screened and censored. Approximately 201,845 persons were
purged between 1945 and 1948.26

Afghanistan
OEF was a high-intensity conflict, short in duration and waged with
precision-guided munition, special operation forces, and Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) personnel. The air campaign, intense as it was, was limited
to conventional military targets, that were few. The air war (7 October to 9
December 2011) caused between 2,500 and 3,000 civilian deaths. In December
2001, another 640 to 800 civilians were killed as a result of American ground
operations. After the battle of Mazar-e-Sharif, on 9 November 2001, the Taliban
regime crumbled, and on 9 December 2001, the Taliban were expelled from
Kandahar. Many of the surviving leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban managed
to retreat to their Pakistani sanctuaries, while their disbanded forces blended
into the Afghan civilian population. By the time of the demise of the Taliban
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regime, 0.014 percent of the Afghan civilian population had been killed by
allied military operations. The percentage of civilian casualties in Afghanistan
is similar to those of the American interventions in Grenada in 1983 (0.045
percent), in Panama in 1989 (0.04 percent), and in the Gulf War in 1990 to 1991
(0.016 percent). It is evident the vast majority of the Afghan population was
not directly affected by OEF and emerged from the war neither traumatized by
defeat nor convinced of the inevitability of radical exogenously imposed change.
In Afghanistan, the Americans tried to transform a tribal, ethnically
divided, illiberal, and undemocratic society into a functioning democracy.
Similar to Germany and Japan, large sectors of the Afghan population did not
want to be educated, reformed, and administered by the invaders. Yet, contrary to the cases of Germany and Japan, the Afghan population was neither
decimated nor compliant, and the Taliban still constituted a real political
option in much of the country. OEF had not created a context auspicious to
the consequent nation-building program, yet the Bush administration saw the
“reconstruction” of Afghanistan as a political opportunity to expand American
soft power in the Muslim world, and transformed a counterterrorist operation
into a military occupation theoretically committed to sweeping moral, political,
and educational reforms.
The American-led transformation project was well received by sectors
of the small urban elite, mostly born and educated under the Communist regime
of President Mohammad Najibullah, but not by the rural Pashtun majority. The
large Pashtun majority in the rural areas, motivated by religious or ideological convictions, fear of Taliban reprisals, distrust of or outright opposition to
the Karzai government, and resentment of the foreign occupation, offered a
good breeding ground for the insurgency. In particular, the socially reactionary Pashtun did not welcome the Western agenda. Their attitude toward the
deposed Taliban regime was complex and ambiguous. The Taliban succeeded
in maintaining order through the rigid implementation of the Sharia. In the
case of women’s rights, for example, the Taliban simply codified into law the
traditional practice of treating women as second class citizens.27 It was obvious,
from the very beginning of the NATO military occupation, the invaders’ conception of law and order and of political reform was not congruent with the
aspirations of many Afghans. The occupiers’ ideological and cultural package
for Afghanistan clashed with the mores of the land, and its lofty objectives
underwent a process of attenuation and degradation.
In 2002, the Taliban started their guerrilla war against the coalition
forces and the weak and corrupt Kabul government.28 The small number of
coalition forces was unable to find and destroy the huge caches of hidden
arms spread across Afghanistan. Pakistan offered a sanctuary, and the porous
border between the two countries allowed the bidirectional flow of people,
weapons, and intelligence. By 2003, Taliban insurgents controlled much of
rural Afghanistan and were able to carry out suicide missions and assassinations in the cities. The Taliban gained political traction by establishing local
underground governments with civilian administrations that collected taxes
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and operated schools and Islamic courts. They had functional links with war
lords, rural strongmen, and farmers, and were able to establish law and order
at the local level. The 2004 general elections extended Karzai’s tenure, but
the country was already destabilized by the Taliban insurgency that harassed
Western forces, derailed reconstruction efforts, and terrorized Afghan cities
and rural areas. The number of Afghan civilians killed by the Taliban rose
systematically after 2006.
The coalition forces waged a counterinsurgency war while implementing, with increasing difficulty, a nation-building project in the midst of violence
and increasing hostility towards the Western allies and their political objectives.
This was a certain recipe for failure, because effective physical and political
reconstruction is impossible in a context characterized by insecurity. The
NATO forces had the almost impossible task of fighting a guerrilla movement
with deep connections with the rural population, while simultaneously trying
to make their program of reforms compatible with the local hierarchies and
customs of Afghanistan. The coalition forces used violence with great restraint
on the assumption that this would gain the good will and acceptance of the
civilian population. They also dropped the idea of forcing radical cultural and
ideological change in Afghanistan, and instead stressed the need for cultural
sensitivity training for their own soldiers. The allies did not attempt to impose
the strict separation between religion and state and accepted the establishment
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In other words, the United States and
its NATO allies progressively reduced their expectations and did not challenge
the ideological and cultural tenets of the Afghan population that did not fit with
democratic liberalism.
In November 2009, given the rising wave of insurgency, General
Petraeus convinced President Obama to commit an additional 30,000 American
troops to Afghanistan. Even with the surge, the military situation continued to
be critical, and in 2011, President Obama and the leaders of the NATO nations
were forced to redefine what success meant in Afghanistan. The president
ordered the withdrawal of 10,000 troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2011,
and announced that another 23,000 would be leaving by the summer of 2012,
and the remainder of combat forces by 2014. In the new paradigm of reduced
expectations, the task of the NATO forces in Afghanistan is to achieve a
modicum of stability.

Conclusion
A transformative military occupation targeted at the radical political
and ideological restructuring of a society is akin to a revolution from above
carried out by a foreign power. The military government involved in a transformative occupation acts as a revolutionary organization that takes control of
the invaded country. It removes the vestiges of the preexisting government, dismisses the previous authorities, dismantles the police and security services, and
presides over the judicial and the educational systems. The occupation government monopolizes the use of force, information, and propaganda, and excludes
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people, ideologies, and organizations that represent actual or potential threat to
their revolutionary agenda. Accordingly, it represses, purges, censors, and proscribes. Social revolutions of this magnitude imply the radical redesign of social
mores and governmental institutions according to the tenets of the victors.
Military occupations are likely to engender resistance, hostility, and
nationalism.29 Opposition to a military occupation may be reduced if there is
either significant ideological congruence between the occupier and the occupied,
or if the occupied population has been so devastated by the preceding war that it
is unwilling and unable to resist. The German occupations of Austria (1938-45)
and northwestern France (1940-44) exemplify the dynamics of an occupation
where there is a significant degree of ideological congruence. In Austria, there
was widespread popular support for annexation—Austrian antisemitism was
strong and pervasive even before the Anschluss, and many Austrians aspired
to be part of the German economic recovery touted by the Nazi regime. Even
when the military situation deteriorated for Germany, faith in Austrian-German
integration under Hitler’s leadership persisted. The support for the Third Reich
and its murderous antisemitic policies diminished only in the last months of
the war.30
In 1940, when the Wehrmacht conquered France, many French were
deeply disenchanted with liberalism and the democratic system of government,
and were eager to give the Germans the benefit of the doubt. France had had fourteen different governments between 1933 and 1939, and in 1940 the mood was
anti-Republican. The Nazis found a deeply divided country, polarized between
the extreme right and the extreme left, both antidemocratic. The French right,
Catholic, antisemitic, fanatically anticommunist, and antisocialist, had a long
history of grievances against the Republic, dating back to the French Revolution
and peaking with the Dreyfus Affair. Hitler’s 1933 victory in Germany not only
energized the French extreme right, it caused fissures in the Parti Communiste
Français. Important Communist leaders left the Party attracted to the idea of
a pan-European national socialist revolution. The German occupation offered
the anti-Republican majority a chance to imagine a radically new country freed
from the shackles of politics as usual. During the first two years of occupation,
even though Hitler considered the French culturally and racially inferior, many
French imagined a Franco-German partnership once the Nazis won the war.31
Preexisting ideological congruence allowed the Nazi occupation governments
in Austria and France to make radical political, legal, and social changes and
conduct genocidal policies with minimal resistance and with the acquiescence,
or collaboration, of the occupied.
When there is no ideological congruence between the occupier and
the occupied, a transformative military occupation government can operate
successfully if the population of the defeated country has been physically and
psychologically shattered by the magnitude of the preceding war, and cannot
organize a nationalist insurgency. During WWII, the Allies were driven by an
unflinching commitment to strategic and tactical objectives, and targeted both
the enemies’ armies and their civilian populations. The number of civilian and
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military casualties, the number of prisoners taken, the level of physical destruction, and the total institutional and political collapse of Germany and Japan,
left the vanquished populations disconcerted, powerless, subdued, and malleable. Even in the absence of ideological congruence between the American
occupiers and the occupied populations of western Germany and Japan, the
American military governments did not have to confront military insurgency,
and were able to implement radical programs of social and political engineering. OMGUS and SCAP developed their agendas of change even when the
objectives of the ideological and political revolution clashed with the ideological and political tenets of the deposed regimes. In occupied western Germany
and Japan, the Americans banned or reformed preexisting political and legal
institutions, parasitized those bureaucratic frameworks that were deemed
useful, and banned all expressions of militarism, nationalism, and racism.
They manipulated, directed, and controlled German and Japanese political and
cultural life by overt and covert methods with an admixture of punishment,
threats, negotiations, and cajoling. Negative policies were complemented with
positive measures designed to provide the German and Japanese populations
with new political, cultural, and social paradigms. The absence of insurgency
allowed the American military governments to impose their revolutionary
political, social, economic, cultural, and ideological changes while engaging in
the urgently needed physical reconstruction of the devastated countries.
In those cases where there is no ideological congruence between the
occupier and the occupied, and where the occupied population has not been
reduced to passive impotence, the occupying power can either resort to genocidal violence attempting to preempt the emergence of an insurgency or be
prepared to deal with resistance and armed rebellion. The German occupation of Czechoslovakia (1938) and Poland (1939), and the Soviet occupation of
Poland (1939), illustrate the first alternative. The Nazis and the Communists
killed tens of thousands of military officers, scientists, intellectuals, artists,
teachers, doctors, priests, and writers, in order to eliminate potential leaders
of an insurgency. Extreme genocidal violence, however, does not automatically solve the problem of insurgency, as the Nazis learned in Poland with the
Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (1942) and the Warsaw Uprising (1944). Afghanistan
illustrates the second alternative. There was little ideological congruence
between the Western alliance and the occupied, and the Taliban regime was
deposed with minimal civilian suffering. In this case, the occupation forces
adopted a military and political strategy targeted at winning the “hearts and
minds” of the Afghan noncombatant population. This strategy has met with
limited success because insurgency emerged and the transformative project
was derailed. NATO forces found it increasingly difficult to impose law and
order, guarantee security, and monopolize information and propaganda, the
essential prerequisites for radical ideological, institutional, and political change.
Small wars do not create the conditions for nation-building projects
when the occupied population is uninterested in, or hostile to, the transformative agenda. OEF defeated the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but much of
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the rural Afghan population, essentially untouched by the war, was reluctant to
adopt the NATO agenda of political and social reforms, enabling the Taliban to
reorganize their clandestine networks, rearm, and provide a political alternative.
This led to the rapid emergence of resistance, insurgency, and anarchy, and to
the resultant collapse of American plans for the transformation of Afghanistan
into a functioning democracy. The Afghanistan experience indicates small wars
targeted at regime change do not create the context of possibility for the success
of transformative military occupations and should not be followed by occupations aimed at nation building.
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